Atomic Energy - Patents - Patent Aspects of Domestic Law, Euratom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency by Hay, Peter H.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 56 Issue 5 
1958 
Atomic Energy - Patents - Patent Aspects of Domestic Law, 
Euratom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
Peter H. Hay 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the European Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, International Law 
Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter H. Hay, Atomic Energy - Patents - Patent Aspects of Domestic Law, Euratom, and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, 56 MICH. L. REV. 770 (1958). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol56/iss5/5 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
770 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [Vol. 56 
ATOMIC ENERGY-PATENTS-PATENT AsPECTS OF DOMESTIC 
LAw, EuRATOM, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGEN-
CY-With the growing importance of atomic energy, conventional 
legal concepts must be adapted and remodeled to fit new situa-
tions. In the area of patent law, the traditional notion that the 
inventor's reward should be a legal monopoly in the invention, 
in the form of a patent, has to be reconciled with the need for 
wide dissemination of technical information. The need for se-
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crecy, for government control over weapons, and for cooperation 
with other countries affects the atomic patent system. These fac-
tors are reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and in the 
agreements establishing two international organizations concerned 
with atomic energy: the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. It 
is the purpose of this comment to sketch some of these patent 
provisions. 
l. Patents in United States Atomic Energy Law 
A. Domestic Law. The Atomic Energy Act of 19461 removed 
from the patent system the broad areas of atomic weapons and 
fissionable materials.2 In order not to discourage invention, pro-
vision was made for a statutory award to be granted by the Patent 
Compensation Board of the Atomic Energy Commission. In addi-
tion, the 1946 act gave the AEC broad powers to declare in the 
public interest a patent not within the above two areas and in 
which the inventor would normally have had a patent monopoly. 
The effect of such a declaration was to permit the use of the patent 
by the government3 and by private licensees under section 7 of 
the act. Theoretically, at least, these provisions were for com-
pulsory licensing.4 
The 1954 act5 revised the approach toward patents considera-
bly; in fact, the patent provisions were among the ones most 
strongly contested in Congress.6 The new law restored to the pat-
1 60 Stat. 755 (1946), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§1801 to 1819. 
2 See Ooms, "The Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act," 15 UNIV. Cm. L. 
REv. 822 (1948). 
3 This would have been possible anyway under 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1498. 
4 Ooms, "The Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act," 15 UNIV. Cm. L. R.Ev. 
822 at 830 (1948). In actuality, the application of the "compulsory licensing" provisions 
of the 1946 act proved more limited in scope than those of .the 1954 act, if only for 
the reason that no §7 license was ever granted under it. Boskey, "Some Aspects of Atomic 
Power Development," 21 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 113 at 120 (1956). See generally Boskey, 
"Progress and Patents in Atomic Energy: The Military and Civilian Uses," 34 TEXAS L. 
REv. 867 (1956); Beckett and Merriman, "Will the Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 Promote Progress or Stifle Invention?" 23 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 195 (1954). 
5 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §§2011 to 2281. 
6 Beckett and Merriman, "Will the Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 Promote Progress or Stifle Invention?" 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 195 (1954). The 
revisions in this area followed a message by President Eisenhower to "Liberalize the 
patent provisions .•. , principally by expanding the area in which private patents 
can be obtained to include the production as well as utilization of fissionable material, 
while continuing for a limited period the authority to require a patent owner to license 
others to use an invention essential to the peacetime application of atomic energy." 100 
CONG. REC. 1924 (1954). 
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ent system all inventions except those in the weapons field and 
those conceived under Commission contracts.7 All other inven-
tions employing fissionable materials were thus made patentable.8 
Another major change was to extend the provision for awards to all 
atomic energy inventions upon application to the Patent Compen-
sation Board.9 Awards, mere substitutes for weapons and fission-
able materials patents under the old law, now provide supplemen-
tary benefits in other areas and thus supply added incentive to 
invention by private enterprise.10 This added stimulus is impor-
tant because of the amount of prior art kept from public disclosure 
under Patent Office secrecy orders making the success of patent 
applications at times doubtful. 
Perhaps the greatest single change in the new law is found in 
the compulsory licensing provisions.11 Alternative procedures are 
provided, one by which the AEC can acquire a compulsory 
license for itself with a right to sublicense and one by which such 
a license may be acquired by a private applicant on his own initia-
tive. In regard to the former, the tests to be met are stricter than 
the comparable test of "public interest" in the 1946 act. There 
now must be a finding that the invention is of primary impor-
tance for the production or utilization of fissionable material or 
atomic energy. In order to obtain a sublicense under the compul-
7 As of November 26, 1957, some 1345 patents were held by the Commission and 
available for licensing on a non-exclusive, royalty-free -basis. AEC, PROGRESS IN PEACEFUL 
UsES OF ATOMIC 'ENERGY Uuly..Dec. 1957) 337 (1958). Some 680 licenses have been granted 
to private industry. Id. at 173. 
s Even an invention having both an atomic weapon application an!l a civilian use 
is patentable, although only with regard to the civilian application. Boskey, "Some Aspects 
of Atomic Power Development,'' 21 LAw AND CONTEM. PROB. 113 at 118 (1956). 
9 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §157, 68 Stat. 947 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §2187. 
10 Proceedings before the Board are subject to judicial review so that, especially in 
cases where the award is a substitute for a patent in the weapons area, the result will 
be the same as if the owner would have ihad to proceed before the Court of Claims under 
28 u.s.c. (1952) §1498. 
11 A wide range of views on this subject was expressed during the debate. Hearings 
before -the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 3323 and H.R. 8862 To Amend the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 129 (1954). Compulsory licensing was 
opposed because of its questionable constitutionality. Beckett and Merriman, "Will the 
Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Promote Progress or Stifle Invention?" 
23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 195 (1954); comment, 43 GEo. L. J. 221 (1955). Small enterprises 
opposed compulsory licensing arguing that the benefit of a patent monopoly under normal 
patent procedures is the way by which ingenuity and initiative can offset the greater 
financial resources of larger corporations. Karl P. Cohen in Hearings Before the Joint 
Committee, supra this note, at 421. Yet the view prevailed that it would be beneficial 
to retain some compulsory licensing features for a limited time. 100 CONG. REc. 14852 to 
14873 (1954). The five-year limitation (to September 1, 1959) of §153(h) of the act was 
put in by the House, over the Senate's preference for a ten-year term, probably yielding 
to small business. 100 CoNG. REc. 12002, 12003 (1954). 
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sory license acquired by the AEC, the applicant must show that 
the license is of primary importance to his activities. Under the 
alternative procedure, private applicants may acquire a compul-
sory license after a finding by the AEC that the granting of the 
license is of primary importance to the furtherance of the objec-
tives of the act.12 The fears of those opposing compulsory licensing 
thus found satisfaction in strict statutory requirements. More-
over, the AEC appears inclined to exercise its compulsory licens-
ing powers sparingly.13 
In order "to keep the Commission fully and currently aware 
of all technology in the field of atomic energy,"14 section 15l(c) 
requires that all inventions be reported within ninety days. The 
requirement is not new but constitutes a liberalization of the 
sixty-day period under section ll(a)(3) of the 1946 act.15 
Two major areas are inadequately dealt with in the 1954 
act, viz., the problem of patents arising out of inventions con-
ceived while under a Commission contract or other relationship 
with the Commission, 16 except if waived by the Commission, and 
the problem of registration abroad of patents held by the Com-
mission. As to inventions conceived while under Commission 
contract or while maintaining a relationship with it, the language 
of the act theoretically prevents the great majority of applicants 
from obtaining a patent unless the AEC makes the admittedly 
difficult decision17 to waive the government's interest.18 Absent 
such waiver, the Commission's suggestion to a licensee concern-
12 The applicable regulations are: Commission-owned Hcenses: 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 
1957) §§SI.IO to Sl.12; conditions with regard to licenses of patents, id., §§81.20 to 81.22; 
patents not yet declared to be of public interest, i.e., compulsory licensing upon the 
initiative of a third party, id., §§81.30 to 81.33. 
13 General Counsel Mitchell of the AEC stated .that "The compulsory licensing pro-
visions of §153 are deemed by the Commission to establish a reserve power. It is not 
anticipated that this authority will be invoked except under compelling circumstances." 
Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and 
State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 194 (1955). 
14 H. Rep. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 25 (1954). 
15 Alternatively, the inventor may file a patent application rather than report in 
which case the AEC will be notified of the invention by the Patent Office pursuant to 
§15l(d). 
16 Atomic 'Energy Act of 1954, §152, 68 Stat. 944 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) 
§2182. The underlying motive for the section was to prevent the 15,000 firms which had 
been engaged in atomic work for the government from securing patents on inventions 
conceived while in the government's employ. Address by Rep. Cole, reprinted in 100 
CoNG. REc. A5858 (1954). 
17 See statement by AEC General Counsel Mitchell in Hearings before -the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and State of .the Atomic Energy 
Industry, 84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 197-199 (1955). 
18 Legislative history points to ,the conclusion ·that the section was never intended 
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·ing the feasibility of a project,19 or a letter addressed to the AEC,20 
not to mention licenses, including access permits to restricted 
data,21 may be relationships within the meaning of the act and 
preclude private patent ownership.22 An additional shortcoming 
of the act is its failure to give direction or encouragement to 
the AEC in the acquisition of foreign patent rights on its own 
patents. While an American manufacturer may find himself 
barred from foreign markets because of the danger of infringe-
ment of patents issued abroad to foreign inventors, the filing of 
patent applications abroad is left merely to the discretion of the 
AEC in cases where it holds the patent right.23 To remedy this 
unsatisfactory situation it has been suggested that, short of repeal 
of the atomic patent provisions in their entirety, the AEC should, 
in all cases where it holds the patent rights but does not intend to 
file abroad, grant the original inventor such an interest in the 
patent as would enable him to protect his foreign interests by 
filing an application.24 
In regard to enforcement of the patent provisions, awards 
may be denied for failure to comply with reporting require-
ments;211 for the same reason, access permits or licenses may be 
to reach inventions under research or commercial licenses. 100 CoNG. REc. 13783 and 
14344 (1954). 
19 Boskey, "Some Aspects of Atomic Power Development," 21 LAW AND CoNTEM. 
PROB. 113 at 129 (1956). 
20 Ooms, "Revision of the Patent Provisions-Good or Bad?" NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL 
CONFERENCE BoARD, CONFERENCE ON ATOMIC ENERGY IN INDUSTRY 279 at 284, 285 (1954). 
21 Boskey, "Some Aspects of Atomic Power Development," 21 LAW AND CoNTEM. PROB. 
113 at 129 (1956). 
22 Some, unfortunately not all, of these questions ~ave been solved, mainly because 
of -the AEC's initiative. Thus, the AEC has determined that with the Access Permit 
Program it may exercise waivers in advance. AEC, EIGHTEENTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 102 
(1955). In its regulations, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1957) §§83.1, 83.2, it made extensive provisions 
for waiver, reserving actually only the area of written agreements between the AEC and 
third parties. 
23 See Report of the Panel on the Impact of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to the 
Joint Co~ttee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 2, p. 661 and vol. 1, p. 
147 (1956). 
24 WORKSHOPS ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC ENERGY 1956, SUMMER INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, University of Michigan Law School, Workshop 
V, p. 92. The AEC has recently stated that only 1% of the atomic energy patents are 
under Patent Office secrecy orders, thus permitting communication of patents domestically 
and the filing of applications abroad on 99% of the privately held patents. The AEC also 
stated that it is filing foreigu applications for patents held by it. AEC, PROGRESS IN 
PEACEFUL UsES OF ATOMIC ENERGY Guly-Dec. 1957) 173-174 (1958). The problems raised 
by the omissions in the Atomic Energy Act in this area may therefore not be serious 
for practical purposes. 
211 See In re Grossman, Docket No. 7, 235 ATOMIC IND. REP. 641 (1955). 
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revoked,26 a patent already issued may be invalidated,21 and crim-
inal liability may be incurred for willful violation.28 
B. Agreements for Cooperation.29 The international activities 
authorized by the 1954 act are generally conditioned upon con-
clusion of a bilateral agreement of cooperation between the 
United States and a foreign nation.30 At present, some thirty-
nine such agreements are in force, of which twenty-nine provide 
for cooperation in atomic research and only ten for cooperation 
in the development of power.31 Four types of agreements should 
be noted in connection with atomic energy patents: the broad 
cooperative agreements for exchange of classified information 
and reciprocal cooperation, such as the agreements with the 
United Kingdom and Canada;32 agreements for the development 
of power involving communication of restricted data, such as 
the agreement with Belgium;33 power agreements involving unre-
stricted data, such as the one with Norway;34 and agreements, 
such as the one with New Zealand,35 providing solely for coopera-
tion in atomic research. 
The British and Canadian agreements distinguish unclassi-
fied from classified inventions and discoveries. In connection with 
the former, provision is made for transfer by either party of all 
26 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1957) §§50.100, 70.6l(b). 
21 This question has not yet been litigated. See Boskey, "Some Aspects of Atomic 
Power Development," 21 LAW AND CoNTEM. PROB. 113 at 125 (1956). 
28Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §223, 68 Stat. 958 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) 
§2273. 
29 See generally Boskey, "Patent Licensing Problems in International Atomic Energy 
Development," 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 554 (1957). 
30 The Atomic (Energy Act of 1954 provides for agreements of cooperation in the 
case of cooperation with other countries (§123), international cooperation in the restricted 
data field (§144), and participation in an international atomic energy pool (§124). Pro-
vision is also made for "international arrangements" in §121 which do not require an 
agreement for cooperation. An international arrangement within the meaning of the 
act [§ll(k)] includes treaties and executive agreements approved by Congress. 
81 AEC, TWENTY-SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT (July 1957) cites, at p. 16, a total of 
36 agreements in force. Since then further agreements were negotiated with Ecuador 
[103 CoNG. REc. 7464 (1957)], Iraq [103 CoNG. REc. 7951 (1957)], Nicaragua [103 CONG. REc. 
9240 (1957)], Brazil [103 CONG. REc. 12060 (1957)], Peru [103 CONG. REc. 11460 (1957)], 
Spain [103 CONG. REc. 13776 (1957)]. An agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany 
on Behalf of Berlin [103 CONG. REc. 9765 (1957)] was concluded after amendment of the 
Atomic Energy Act. P.L. 85-14, Sept. 2, 1957, 71 Stat. 11. In December 1957, a total of 
39 agreements were reported in force without, however, a listing of the particular coun-
tries. AEC, PROGRESS IN PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY (July-Dec. 1957) 190 (1958). 
32 T.I.A.S. 3321 (1955), T.I.A.S. 3304 (1955) respectively. Also see agreement with 
Australia, 102 CoNG. REc. 11430 (1956). 
33 T.I.A.S. 3301 (1955). 
34 103 CONG. REc. 2519 (1957). Its provisions in this area are the same as those in the 
agreements with Brazil, Peru, and Spain, note 31 supra. 
85 102 CONG. REC. 10403 (1956). 
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rights to the inventions, discoveries and patent applications in 
the country of the other, retaining only a non-exclusive, royalty-
free license. Two limitations should be noted: (1) the provision 
covers only inventions employing information communicated un-
der the cooperation agreement, and (2) the other government, its 
agency or a corporation controlled by it, must own an interest 
in the invention. Thus, individuals and private enterprises are 
not directly affected.36 A further provision affords private parties 
national treatment with respect to licensing under patents owned 
by the other government in the latter's own country or in third 
countries. While classified inventions are subject to all the above 
provisions, the agreements contain additional provisions intended 
to assure the continued secrecy of these inventions. Thus, it is 
provided that no patent application containing classified informa-
tion may be filed except under conditions mutually agreed upon. 
This also applies to the filing of applications in third countries 
not parties to the agreement. 
The limited patent coverage of the Belgian agreement31 is 
perhaps more typical of patent provisions in classified agreements. 
In its Article IX it simply gives the United States all rights, in 
its own country, in inventions made by any person under the 
jurisdiction of the Belgian Government as a result of the com-
munication of restricted data to the Belgian Government. This 
covers inventions made while the agreement is in effect and in 
the subsequent three years. No provision is made for a non-
exclusive, royalty-free license for the Belgian Government in 
this country, nor are there any provisions for an interchange of 
patent rights. The reason for the different approach, and why 
these provisions may be more typical than those in the British and 
Canadian agreements, may be that it contemplates a unilateral 
flow of information from the United States to Belgium rather than 
being designed for cooperation on a reciprocal basis. 
Power agreements involving non-restricted data, typical of 
which is the agreement with Norway,38 and the research agree-
36 As a caveat to the statement, it should be remembered that individuals could be 
included indirectly. Thus if Canadian information is communicated to the United States 
and -by the latter transmitted to a United States enterprise, an invention might become 
United States property because conceived under a relationship with the AEC. Foreign 
information transmitted directly to the United States enterprise may give rise to a United 
States property interest if the invention is either in the weapons field or is made use of 
under the compulsory licensing provisions. 
31 T.LA.S. 3301 (1955). 
38 103 CONG. R.Ec. 2519 (1957). 
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ment concluded with New Zealand39 may be considered together. 
Article III(c) of the Norwegian agreement excludes from its cov-
erage all information which the parties are not permitted to 
communicate because it is privately owned.40 The agreement with 
New Zealand which expressly excludes the communication of 
dassified data makes no mention at all of patents. Seemingly, the 
explanation for their absence lies in the fact that inventions un-
der unclassified information either have already been patented or 
can be patented abroad when conceived by an American inven-
tor. 41 In either case, American interests in such inventions would 
be fully protected and would not require contractual safeguards 
similar to those found in the classified agreements.42 
II. The European Atomic Enerr;y Community (EURATOM) 
The unique character of the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (EURATOM), as an international organization estab-
lished by treaty among sovereign states,43 whose member countries 
retain all sovereignty except in the limited areas delegated to the 
community, accounts for the complexity of its patent provisions.44 
It possesses certain "supranational" features,45 exemplified by the 
transfer of certain powers to deal directly with individuals and 
is not limited to transactions with governments. 
39 102 CoNG. REc. 10403 (1956). 
40 Strictly speaking, this article does not seem to add much since privately-owned 
information and inventions could never have been communicated unless the government 
first acquired an interest in them either by compulsory licensing or because the invention 
was conceived under a relationship with the AEC. For the latter see note 22 supra. 
41 The problems involved in patenting abroad by an American inventor of inventions 
in which the AEC either has acquired an interest or which involve classified information 
were noted earlier. Cf. notes 23 and 24 supra. 
42 Two further international activities of the United States should be noted: Patent 
interchange agreements were concluded [e.g., Turkey, T.I.A.S. 3809 (1956); France, T.I.A.S. 
3782 (1957)] providing for exchange of patent rights and technical information for defense 
purposes. These agreements were concluded under the United States Mutual Defense 
Programs and expressly exclude atomic energy. However, one atomic energy patent ex-
change agreement was concluded between the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Canada. AEC, TWENTY-FIRsr SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 104, 105 (1957). Patents developed 
during wartime cooperation and owned by the three governments as of November 15, 
1955 are covered. 
43 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
44 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and 
connected documents, Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market 
and Euratom, Brussels (1957). The treaty went into effect January I, 1958. 
45 Analogies can here ,be drawn to the supranational features of the European Coal 
and Steel Community. In this context see Bebr, "The European Coal and Steel Com-
munity: A Political and Legal Innovation," 63 YALE L. J. 1 (1953); MosER, Dm UEBER-
STAATLICHE GERICHTSBARKEIT DER MONTANUNION (1955). 
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, A. Acquisition and Dissemination of Information and Patents. 
The provisions of the treaty dealing with the acquisition and 
.dissemination of information and patents can generally be divided 
;into three areas: (I) those dealing with the communication of 
'information which is controlled by the community, (2) those deal-
·ing with the acquisition of information and patent rights by the 
community, and (3) those dealing with the dissemination of in-
formation and patents so acquired. 
Articles 12 and 13 of the treaty cover communication of in-
formation including patents, utility models and the like which the 
.community itself owns, is contractually authorized to make avail-
able, or in the case of mere information, is otherwise free to dis-
seminate. The community must make this information available 
upon proper application. If information communicated to the 
community was restricted as to dissemination because of its classi-
fied nature, the restriction must be observed by the community.46 
The provision for acquisition of information by the com-
: munity concerning new patent applications, patents, and utility 
models47 envisions the communication by the member state of 
the contents of a patent application made within its jurisdiction 
. (if the owner consents), or the communication of the existence of 
·a patent application (if the owner does not consent to the com-
munication of its contents). If only the latter is communicated, 
the Commission, the community's executive organ, may require 
the communication of the contents of the patent after a period 
of eighteen months, thus, in effect, enabling the owner to de1ay 
communication of the contents of his patent. In addition, mem-
ber states are required to communicate unpublished patent appli-
'cations which do not deal with nuclear subjects but seem prima 
'facie related. In such cases, the longer period of eighteen months 
from the filing of the application is allowed ab initio. Communi-
cation of the contents of patents or patent application under these 
rules does not entitle the community to make use of them, but is 
only for the purpose of documentation. In order to acquire the 
right to use, two alternative procedures are available. An owner 
may use an "amicable arrangement" to communicate patent infor-
46 It should be noted that the last mentioned condition of art. 13 is reiterated in 
art. 24 dealing with classified information. The main difference between the communica-
tion of classified vs. non-classified information is that the former may be communicated 
~nly to a person or an enterprise which is not a "joint enterprise" as set up under the 
treaty on the condition that the respective state is used as an intermediary. For "joint 
enterprise" see note 49 infra. 
47 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 16. 
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mation to the community directly and to license it to make use of 
the patent; member states and enterprises can use the community, 
as an intermediary for an exchange among themselves.48 Alterna-
tively, the community can acquire the right to use, or to license 
a third party to use a patent by means of compulsory licensing .. 
The provision for compulsory licensing differentiates between 
the conditions under which the community or its joint enter--
prises49 are entitled to compulsory licenses and the conditions 
under which private persons or other enterprises may obtain like 
licenses. In the former case, it need only be shown that the grant-• 
ing of a license is "necessary to the pursuit of their own research. 
or indispensable for the operating of their facilities." As to the-
second group of applicants, the requirements are more stringent .. 
There must be a showing that (1) the needs for nuclear energy in 
the territories where the invention is protected have not been met, 
(2) that the owner of the patent has himself, or through his licen-
sees, failed to remedy those needs, and (3) that the applicant· 
would be able to fulfill those needs if granted a compulsory 
license.50 As an important difference from the American system, 
the granting of a compulsory license to a third party:i1 is thus 
made a matter of strict necessity~ with the needs of the nuclear 
economy, as opposed to the needs of the applicant, the vital' 
factor.52 
The mechanics of the compulsory licensing process are ex-
tremely complicated. After the Commission has notified the pat-· 
ent ownet'3 of its election to exercise its compulsory licensing-
powers,54 two courses of action are open to the owner. He may 
propose a "compromise," which means a referral of the case tor 
an arbitration committee. 55 Alternatively the owner may refuse 
48 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 15. 
49 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 17. A "joint enterprise" is an enterprise set up by the 
Community and enjoys independent international status within the community. Treaty, 
note 44 supra, arts. 45 to 51. 
50 Furthermore, if the patent be one not specifically involving a nuclear invention;, 
two years must have elapsed before a compulsory license can ,be issued. 
51 A "third party" includes those enterprises not set up by the community, and 
private persons in the member states; ·this constitutes an analogy to the third party in 
the American compulsory licensing system. 
52 Licenses are on a non-exclusive, royalty-free ·basis just as in .the American system .. 
53 The mechanics for the grant or acquisition of a compulsory license are set forth 
in arts. 18 to 23 of ·the treaty, note 44 supra. 1 
54 The conditions for compulsory licensing are set out in art. 17 of the treaty, note 
44 supra. . 
55 The "compromise" is provided for by art. 20, .the Arbitration Committee by art: 
18 of the treaty, note 44 supra. 
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to invoke the arbitration process, thereby forcing the community 
to apply to the owner's government for the license. In the former 
case, the arbitration committee will have power to inquire wheth-
er the request of the Commission is in conformity with the com-
pulsory licensing provisions. The decisions of the committee are 
final and have the force of res judicata unless appealed to the 
Court of Justice within one month. Here, the review power of 
the court is more limited than when reviewing decisions of the 
Commission with respect to granting licenses for the use of its 
-own information. While in the latter case the court has "full 
jurisdiction" to review the decision, 56 it is restricted to a review 
of the "regularities of form" and the "interpretation given . . . to 
the provisions of this Treaty" when decisions of the arbitration 
committee are appealed.57 The explanation seemingly lies in the 
fact that in the one case the Commission is an interested party 
while in the compulsory licensing case the owner and the Com-
mission have previously been heard by an impartial body, the 
arbitration committee. Therefore, only the regularity of the ad-
ministrative process need be reviewed. Where the owner refuses 
to permit arbitration or fails to invoke the arbitration provisions, 
the Commission may apply to the owner's state for the license. A 
hearing is required,58 to be conducted by the member state, as 
to compliance with compulsory licensing provisions. The action 
of the state, both its refusal or its grant of the license, as well as 
its inaction may be appealed to the Court of Justice. Here, juris-
diction is broader than in the case of review of decisions of the 
arbitration committee.50 Arbitration is compulsory for the Com-
mission or the third party applying for a compulsory license. 
56 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 144. 
57 Treaty, note 44 supra, art 18, 1[2. 
58 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 21, 1[2. It is interesting that the procedure provides for 
a utilization of the member state as an intermediary for the enforcement of requests of 
the Commission with respect to the communication of information and the granting 
of compulsory licenses. This is especially true in the case of an owner's refusal to 
submit .to arbitration. The only case of direct enforcement is in the case of an award 
by the arbitration committee which, if not appealed, is directly enforceable under art. 
164 of the treaty. When compared with the Coal and Steel Community, these provisions 
show less "supranationality" unless the acts of the arbitration committee be equated with 
the ordinary acts of the Commission and the phenomenon of the utilization of national 
enforcement procedures be explained .by the analysis made earlier, viz., that the com-
munity is an interested party. 
59 This follows ·by implication from art. 21, 1[5 of the treaty which gives the court 
jurisdiction to review the case with respect to the .fulfilment of the conditions of arL 17 
rather than restricting it to the review of ·the "regularities of form." The reason is again 
the need for a more searching review of the decisions of an interested party. 
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Once compulsory licensing has been decreed under either of 
two alternative procedures, the owner is entitled to "full compen-
sation."60 The meaning of "full compensation" presents an inter-
esting question. The American law provides for "reasonable com-
pensation" in the case of compulsory licensing61 and for "just 
compensation" in the case of inventions in the weapons field.62 
Thus, while the American act distinguishes a taking (in the 
weapons area where no patent can be obtained) from the mere 
reduction of patent benefits (in the case of compulsory licensing), 
the EURATOM treaty speaks of "full compensation." This, 
semantically, suggests compensation for a taking in a situation of 
mere compulsory licensing.63 Procedurally, ample provision is 
made to insure proper determination of full compensation. 
Should the parties fail to agree, resort may be had to the arbitra-
tion committee. The committee award is appealable to the court, 
again only on the limited grounds of irregularities of form or 
misinterpretation of the treaty. Should the court's judgment be 
unacceptable to the owner, the amount of compensation is to be 
determined by competent national agencies of the member states.64 
Furthermore, the decision of the agency or the arbitration com-
mittee is subject to revision after one year, if new facts65 justify it. 
B. Provisions Concerning Security Safeguards. A member 
state communicating the existence or contents of a patent appli-
cation may request a particular security classification which will 
be automatically applied to the invention.66 Such inventions are 
still subject to use, either with the consent of the owner or under 
the compulsory licensing system, with the qualification that the 
consent of the particular member state must be obtained. Consent 
60 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 17(3). 
61Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §157(c)(l), 68 Stat. 947, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) 
§2187(c)(I). 
62 Id., §157(c)(2). 
63 As a caveat it should be pointed out that the American distinction may be based 
on tlie particular coverage of ·that act, viz., weapons and compulsory licensing, so that the 
distinction perhaps should not be carried over into :the interpretation of the EURATOM 
Treaty. Moreover, the term "full compensation," though contained in the official transla-
tion, is not contained in the original text of the treaty which speaks of "pleine indemnite." 
64 In connection with the considerations raised in note 58 supra, it is interesting to 
note that the court's determination is not finally binding on the owner in the area of 
compensation, again an indication of the less than supranational character of this treaty 
in comparison with that of the Coal and Steel Community. Considerations in this area 
may, of course, be the greatly diversified national patent laws which national jealousy 
did not permit .to be harmonized. 
65 E.g., new economic circumstances or radically changed nuclear technology. 
66 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 16. 
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may be refused only for reasons of national defense.67 The Com-
mission is charged with the responsibility of developing a secur-
ity system to safeguard classified information. In recognition of 
the community's interest in inventions, the classification may be 
changed by the unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers and 
upon advice of the Commission. 68 In return for the availability of 
classified patents, the community assumes liability for any damage 
arising out of improper use or communication to unauthorized 
third persons.69 
C. The Community's Interest in the International Agreements 
of Members. A distinction must be dra,vn between international 
agreements of the member states already in existence on the ef-
fective date of the treaty and those concluded thereafter. As to 
the former, no communication of patents need be made to the 
Commission if an agreement with a third country or an inter-
national organization precludes it.70 Indeed, no member state 
may invoke the treaty in order to evade international obligations 
undertaken prior to the signing of the treaty.71 In order to har-
monize and centralize existing international agreements, member 
states are urged to negotiate with their treaty partners in an effort 
to cause a transfer of the rights and obligations under the agree-
ments to the community.12 Such a process would ordinarily bring 
about a new agreement consented to by the original parties and 
a qualified majority vote of the community's council of ministers. 
67 These provisions are of great importance inasmuch as t:he treaty does not specifical• 
ly exclude weapons from the general area of atomic energy covered. Absent the above 
provision, national defense programs (such as .the French nuclear defense program) would 
be endangered. 
68 Where the owner has ·been prejudiced by .the classification or by a change of 
classification, art. 27 provides for compensation according to the laws of the member 
states. This is also true if the owner, under art. 26, is prevented from filing his patent 
outside tlie community. These compensation provisions are not applicable .to the com-
munity itself and patents owned -by it. 
69 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 28. 
70 Bilateral agreements entered into by the United States with the six !European 
countries after the signing and before the effective date of EURATOM commonly provide 
for such prospective transfer under certain conditions. See Article II of the Agreement 
with Germany, 103 CONG. REc. 9871 at 9873 (1957). 
71 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 105, 1Jl. Conversely, art. 105, 1J2 provides that the 
international obligation shall not be used to evade the Treaty if it was undertaken 
between the signing and the ratification of the Treaty. In the light of some European 
opposition to EURATOM, tliis provision was probably designed to curb a possible 
flourishing of bilateral agreements which could later be asserted against the treaty. 
72 Needless to say an international obligation undertaken before the signing of the 
treaty will continue -to take precedence over it under art. 105, 1Jl if no agreement can 
be reached whereby the rights and obligations are assumed by the community. 
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Future international agreements between member states and 
third countries or international organizations in the field of atomic 
energy will be concluded by the Commission. Alternatively, the 
Commission may authorize the member state to conclude the 
agreement itself,73 subject to the approval of the Commission.u 
The scope of the Commission's inquiry apparently is confined to 
the question whether the proposed agreement comports with the 
treaty. Its determination, like the decisions of the arbitration 
committee, is subject to limited review by the court. 
III. The International Atomic Energy Agency75 
Under the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
member states "shall" make available information acquired as a 
result of assistance rendered by the agency; furthermore, they 
"should" make available any other information they deem "help-
ful" to the agency.76 Information so acquired, as well as infor-
mation developed by the agency itself, must be made available 
to other members. No provision is, made in the article requiring 
the agency to make information available77 for the protection of 
the agency's patent interests in inventions developed with the in-
formation so communicated. Apart from the preceding require-
ments, the agency can furnish information as part of the assistance 
rendered by it under the "Agency Projects."78 "Project Agree-
ments" are required to contain a patent clause whereby the as-
sisted country recognizes the agency's and the members' interest 
in patents resulting from the assistance rendered.79 In order to 
73 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 29. This is also applicable .to contracts between the 
member states and nationals of a third country. 
74 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 103. Arts. 29 and 103 are probably the only provisions 
in any international agreement whereby sovereign states virtually relinquish their right 
to conduct foreign relations, even if only in the limited area of atomic energy. This 
phenomenon is not paralleled •by the otherwise more supranational Coal and Steel Com-
munity which can conclude agreements only for itself (not for the member states), as 
it did in the Agreement of Association with the United Kingdom. 
75 The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency is contained in 
IAJ!.A/CS/13, Nov. I, 1956. For a discussion of the statute, see Bechhoefer and Stein, 
"Atoms for Peace: The New International Atomic Energy Agency," 55 ,MICH. L. REv. 
747 (1957). The United States joined the agency by passing the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Participation Act, P.L. 85-177, 71 Stat. 453 (1957). 
76 Statute, note 75 supra, art. VIII(B) and (A), respectively. 
77 Statute, note 75 supra, art. VIII(C). 
78 Agency Projects, provided for by art. XI of the statute, are projects whereby the 
agency renders assistance, or arranges for assistance to member states seeking it in regard 
to fissionable materials, and other "services." 
79 Statute, note 75 supra, art. XI(F)(5). 
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explain more fully these two alternative modes of communication 
of information and the patent questions arising therefrom, analy-
sis must proceed in terms of the different sources of the infor-
mation eventually supplied by the agency to the inventor country. 
A. Information Communicated by Member States. Three 
distinct situations can be recognized here: information supplied 
voluntarily under Article VIII(B) which is also generally avail-
able; information supplied voluntarily under Article VIII(B) 
but supplied specially to the agency; and information supplied 
under the requirement to supply information resulting from 
assistance rendered by the agency. 
Where the agency is provided information generally available, 
such as a scientific publication, the agency apparently does not 
acquire an interest in patented inventions conceived by a country 
to which it passed on the information, since the information could 
have been obtained elsewhere. Where information is voluntarily 
supplied by a, member state, but under a special relationship with 
the agency, it seems probable that the communicating country 
will attach conditions to the dissemination, thus protecting its 
patent interests. Where it does not, the agency itself can probably 
attach such conditions in spite of its unqualified duty to make 
information available. This would seem so because the duty to 
make "available" need not be interpreted as a duty to allow the 
"use." Furthermore, the agency could communicate such infor-
mation under a project agreement in which case the statute calls 
for the inclusion of a clause protecting the agency's patent inter-
ests. 80 The difficulty here is that it would be necessary to inter-
pret the word "services" in the project agreements81 to include 
"information. " 82 
Where information or patents are supplied to the agency 
under a member's duty to make available all information and 
patents resulting from agency assistance, the agency's duty to 
make information available again cannot be interpreted to require 
authorization to use such information or patents. On the con-
trary, it would seem that the agency becomes the owner of patents 
so communicated; its duty to make information available would 
then at most be a duty to make known the existence of the patent, 
80Ibid. 
81 Statute, note 75 supra, art XI(A) and (C). 
82 This problem is also raised by Bechhoefer and Stein, "Atoms for Peace: The New 
International Atomic Energy Agency," 55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 747 at 770, note 98 (1957), with 
regard to ,the interpretation of "services" in art. Xl(F)(3). 
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the use of which may be licensed under conventional processes of 
patent law. The only possible qualification is that the agency may 
have a duty to grant licenses, though there seems to be no reason 
to require that such a license should be royalty-free. 
B. Information Originating with the Agency. When informa-
tion originates with the agency, the situation is virtually the 
same as when information is voluntarily communicated to the 
agency without protective conditions attached and is passed on by 
the agency to an inventing country. Again the situation is one 
where dissemination must be made by virtue of the requirement 
to make information available, with no provision for the inclusion 
of a patent clause. Again, it seems that the agency's duty to make 
available is not so far-reaching as to require authorization to make 
use of the information. The agency should therefore be able to 
attach conditions to any communication it makes. Alternatively, 
it should be able to communicate the information pursuant to a 
project agreement and be protected by the latter's patent clause, 
as previously discussed. · 
Reasons for the very general treatment of the problems of in-
formation and patents in the statute, as compared to the far-
reaching activities and powers of the EURA TOM Commission, 
can be found in the different position occupied by the agency 
with regard to member states as well as in the fact that the safe-
guarding of patent interests can largely be handled contractually. 
Perhaps the basic reason, however, was a desire to leave the statute 
as free from details as possible, thus leaving greater freedom for 
policy shaping with the agency's board of governors which is 
composed of the atomically most advanced countries.83 
Conclusion 
The above examination indicates the EURA TOM provisions 
to be the most complicated in the field of atomic energy patents. 
The explanation lies in the nature of the community as an inter-
national organization composed of sovereign states. Like the 
American law, it relies on compulsory licensing to satisfy the need 
for dissemination of atomic information and patents, and thus 
cuts down on the conventional patent monopoly accorded inven-
tors. Compared with the American law and EURATOM, the In-
83 See Bechhoefer and Stein, "Atoms for Peace: The New International Atomic 
Energy Agency," 55 MICH. L. REv. 747 at 750, note 23 (1957). 
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,ternational Agency has only very general provisions. This may be 
explained both by the fact that policy decisions were to be left 
. to the board of governors, with the drafters of the statute only 
providing the framework, as well as by the fact that much of the 
agency's activity will be as an intermediary between states. The 
patent problem can thus often be handled contractually. 
In the field of United States international activities, patent 
.provisions are, for practical purposes, found only in the bilateral 
· agreement for cooperation in the field of power development 
when classified data are communicated. They are not found in 
,the unclassified power or the research agreements. 
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